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Summary findings
One rationale for debt reduction operations under the  investment and discuss  assumptions-under  which it is
Brady Plan has been, ';  alleviating  the debt overhang,  to  possible to obtain a closed-form solution to the model.
improve investment efficiency.  Brady-type  debt and dcbt-  Their empirical  estimates indicate that the general
service reduction (within a strong policy framework,  bounds derived in the first step tend to overstate
where there is a track record of economic adjustment)  substantially  the efficiency  gains of debt reduction
has been shown to affect devclopment significantly.  operations. In Mexico's case, for cxample, the upper-
The principle benefit of eliminating the debt overhang  bound estimnate  of efficiency  gains is USS15  billion, but
is to improve investment incentives  for private investors  the point estimate is only abour US$1 billion.
- direct liquidity relief is secondary. So, evaluating a  What are the policy implications of their low point
debt and debt-service  reduction operation shoulo involve  estimates? The debt-overhang disincentive  may not be as
estimating efficiency  gains as well as direct financial  important as the "rvader problem of debtors' credit
savings,  constraints in international capital markets.
Bulow, Rogoff, and Zhu present a method (requiring  How can new loan packages  -o developing  countries
only weak assumptions)  for establishing  an upper bound  be structured to maximize investment incenrives?  By
on the efficiency  impact of debt reductions. The key  using loans rather than outright grants, donors can give a
reference framework for evaluating  much more complex  country more funds for current investment  at lower
Brady-type  debt deals is open-market debt buybacks.  present discounted cxpense. But grants, unlike loans, do
Their approacb to determining this upper bound  not distort investment incentives.
hinges on the assumption that efficiency  gains on a  In short, if a credit-constrained country srarts  with no
straight open-market repurchase of debt never exceed  debt overhang, the first tranche of aid should probably
the gains to creditors If an open-market buyback indeed  be in hard loans. As total transfers increase, if the
reduces the debt overhang and moves  ;  country toward  borrowing country has not gained access to pri-ate
more (and more efficient) investmetn, creditors will  capital markets, marginal transfers should be gramts.  The
anticipate this in setting a price for reniitting their claims.  optimal strategy for ne-w  flows can involve  both
So, at least part of the efficiency  gains  are dissipated in  increasing  grants and decreasing  loans. When transfers
additional capital gains to creditors.  are expected to be heavy, a case can be made for using
To give point estimates to efficiency  gains, they  grants exclusively.
develop a simple two-period model of debt overhang and
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Summary
One of the main  rationales  for debt redaction  operations  under  the Brady
Plan  has been  to  alleviate  the  debt  overhang  in order  to  enhance  investment
efficiency.  Earlier  research  has  pointed  out  that Brady-type  debt  and  debt
service -reduction  has a significant  development  impact when it is implemented  in
the  contest  of  a  strong  policy  framework  and  a  track  record  of  economic
adjustment  reform.  The priLnciLpal  benefit  of eliminating  a debt overhang  is the
improvement  of  investment  incentives  for private  investors,  while  the  direct
liquidity  relief  is only of secondary  importance.
Thus the evaluation  of a debt and debt service reduction  operation  should
I-nclude  estimates of efficiency  gains as  well  as the usual calculation  of direct
financial savings achieved.  This paper first considers amethod  for establishing
an  upper  bound  on  the  efficiency  impact  of  debt  reductions,  a method  that
requires  only  relatively  weak  assumptions.  The  key  reference  framework  for
evaluating much more complex Brady-type  debt deals is open-market  debt buybacks.
Our approach  of bounding  the efficiency  gains hinges  on the proposition
that  the  efficiency  gains  to a  straight  open-market  repurchase  of  debt never
exceed the gains to creditors.  If an open-market buyback indeed ameliorates  debt
overhang  and induces  a country to move  to a higher  and more  efficient  level of
investment,  creditors will  anticipate  this in deciding what  price  they require
to remit their claims.  So at least part of the effimcpiency  gains will necessarily
be dissipated  in additional  capital gains to creditors.
To go further  --  to give  point estimates  to efficiency  gains  --  we develop
a  simple  two-period  model  of  debt  overhang  and  investment,  and  discuss
assumptions  under which  it is possible  to obtain  a closed-form  solution  to the
model.  Our empirical estimates  indicate that the general bounds derived earlier
tend  to  substantially  overstate  the  efficiency  gains  of  debt  reduction
operations.  In the case of Mexican debt reduction,  for example, the upper bound
efficeuncy  gains estimate  is US$15 billion, but our point estimate is only about
1US$1  billion.
hthe  policy implication of our low point estimates  is that the debt overhang
T  the usual  disclaimer  applies.  We thank Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias,  Ronald
Johannes,  Homi Kharas,  Miguel Kiguel,  and colleagues  in the Bank for the useful
comments on an earlier version  of the paper.--  ._disincentive  itself  may not  be as important  as the  broader  problem  that debtors
are credit constrained in international  capital markets.  This raises the
interesting-question  of how new loan packages  to developing  countries  might  be
structured  so  as to  maximize  investment  incentives. By using  loans  rather  than
outright grants, donors can provide a  country with more funds for current
investment  at lower  present  discounted  expense. But  grants,  unlike  loans,  have
the advantage  of not distorting  investment  incentives.
The  analysis  can  be extended  to assess  the  efficiency  implications  of this
tradeoff. It appears  to confirm  the conventional  financial  wisdom regarding  a
credit-constrained  country. For such  a  country,  if it starts  from  a position  of
no debt overhang,  the first tranche  of aid should  be most probably  in the form
of hard loans.  As total  transfers  increase,  if the borrowing  country  has not
gained access to the private capital markets, marginal transfers should be
grants. Indeed,  the  optimal  strategy  for  new flows  can  involve  both increasing
grants  and decreasing  loans.  At very high levels  of expected  transfers,  there
is:a case for  using grants  exclusively.
This research  is part of a larger  effort in the International  Economics
Department  to understand  the costs and  benefits to countries  of debt and debt
service  reduction  arrangements. The analysis  on structuring  new loan  packages
also sheds some light on the pressing issue of resolving debt problems for
severely Lndebted  low-income  countries.  Given the large debt overhang these
countries  face, a strategy  of replacing existing  nonconcessional  debt by new
concessional  loans  seems  to be an appropriate  policy response.
2-- , 7,  -. 
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- - 1  Introduction
One of the  main rationales  for debt reduction  operations  under  the Brady
Plan  has  been to alleviate  debt  overhang  and  enhance  efficiency. But  while many
Brady  Plan deals  have  been considered  quite  successful,  there  does  not  exist  any
generally accepted methodology for empirically measuring  their efficiency
impact. 1 One  can,  in  principle, estimate a  large  structural model  and
quantitatively  simulate  debt  reduction,  but  such  an exercise  involves  a  plethora
of theoretical  assumptions  and empirical  estimates.
Section  2 of this paper  considers  a method  for  establishing  bounds  on the
efficiency  impact  of debt  reductions  that are  extremely  simple  to calculate  and
require  only  relatively  weak assumptions.  The  central  proposition  underlying  our
approach is that although a country may benefit from large Brady Plan type
negotiated  deals,  it  never  benefits  from straight  open-market  buybacks  of debt.
It is  straightforward  to  extend  this  proposition  to the  case of  lending  packages
to a  country  that has  not  previously  received  assistance. We use  this result  to
provide efficiency  bounds on new loans  as well as on Brady  Plan debt reduction
deals.
While  the  ex  post  efficiency  bounds  derived  in section  2  appear  to  be quite
informative,  it is not  possible  to go further  without assuming  more structure.
In section 3, we summarize  a  version of the standard  two-period  model of debt
overhang  and investment  developed  by Bulow,  Rogoff  and Zhu (1994). As is well
known, empirically  assessing the value of risky debt requires modern option
pricing  techniques  which  have,  of course,  become  routine  in  the  investment  world.
Standard option pricing formulas, however, do not  allow for moral  hazard
problems,  which are  especially  important  in the  case  of  developing  country  debt.
Specifically,  a country's  incentive  to invest  can  be very sensitive  to its  debt
levels.
1  Claessens,  Diwan  and  Fernandez-Arias  (1992)  provide  estimates  on how  much
countries gain by using menu-driven  Brady Plan deals rather than open-market
buybacks.  However, they  do not derive  the efficiency  gain for  negotiated  debt
restructuring  deals.
3This  paper  offers  a  new approach  that  deals  with this issue.  We show that
X  K for  certain  probability  distributions  for  the  underlying  productivity
disturbance,  it is possible  to obtain  closed-form  option  pricing solutions  for
-investment  and the price of debt.  Based on these closed-form  solutions,  we
derive  point  estimates  of debt  overhang  effects  and  show  that  the  general  bounds
derived -in  section 2  often  tend  to  substantially overstate the  negative
efficiency  effects of debt overhang.  In the  case of Mexico, for example,  the
upper  bound efficiency  estimate  is US$15  billion  but our  point  estimate  is only
US$1  billion.
The  model  also  yields  a  number  of interesting  comparative  statics  results.
For  example, in  the  standard exogenous investment model,  a  rise  in  the
variability  of the  underlying  productivity  shock  would unambiguously  lower the
value of a country's  debt to creditors. As the  variance  of  the  shock  rises,  the
value of the country's option to default rises; therefore  the creditors  must
lose.  However,  with moral  hazard,  a rise in  the  variability  of  disturbances  can
easily induce  an improvement  in investment  incentives  sufficient  to raise the
value of creditors'  claims. In addition,  a  strengthening  of creditors'  ability
to enforce repayments  will not necessarily  exacerbate  debt overhang  and lower
investment. On the contrary,  countries facing  tough creditors  may invest  more
rather  than less.
This interesting  result  points  to the  potential  application  of our model
to issues  of structuring  new  loan  packages  to countries  that  have not  previously
received assistance.  By using loans rather than outright  grants, donors can
provide a  country with more funds for current investment at lower present
discounted expense.  But  grants, unlike loans, have the advantage of not
distorting  investment  incentives. The  model can  be  used  to  assess  the  efficiency
implications of  this tradeoff and  it  appears to confirm the  conventional
financial  wisdom.  The first tranche  of aid should  be most probably  in the form
of  hard loans. As total  transfers  increase,  marginal  transfers  should  be grants;
indeed,  the optimal  strategy  can involve  both increasing  grants  and decreasing
loans.  At very high levels  of expected  transfers,  there is a case for using
grants  exclusively.
4-=  2  Bounding  the Ex-Post Efficiency  Gains from Debt Restructurings
Before turning to more complex restructurings,  it is helpful to first
review  the basic economics  of straight  open-market  buybacks,  which form a key
reference  point  for  evaluating  larger  deals. Sovereign  debt  restructurings  such
as those conducted  under the Brady Plan are generally far  more complex than a
simple  open-market  buyback  of  debt. Negotiated  deals  generally  provide  creditors
with a  broad  menu  of asset  options. They often  involve  infusions  of  new  official
lending  and  occasionally  private  lending. And perhaps  most important,  negotiated
deals generally involve mechanisms to mitigate the free rider problem that
plagues  straight  market  buybacks. Nevertheless,  despite  these  sharp  differences
between buybacks  and negotiated  deals,  we will show that straight  open-market
buybacks (and "reverse  buybacks") provide a valuable frame of reference for
measuring  the  efficiency  and  distribution effects  of  much  more  complex
transactions.
Our  results in this section hinge on the following proposition: The
efficiency  gains to a straight  open-market  repurchase  of debt  never exceed  the
gains to creditors. 2 That is,  even if an open-market repurchase of debt
enhances  efficiency  by ameliorating  debt  overhang,  the  benefits  are  never  enough
to compensate  for the leakage to creditors.  The reader should  note that this
proposition  refers  only  to open-market  buybacks  in  which  each  individual  creditor
resells  his claim  to the debtor  on an individual  and strictly  voluntary  basis.
It does  not refer  to large  negotiated  buybacks  such  as Brady  Plan  deals in  which
the debtor can (and  often does) succeed in repurchasing  debt at a lower price
than  would be possible  in a buyback.  Moreover, the proposition  that a country
does not benefit from open-market buybacks hinges on some (we argue quite
2 The  proposition  that the  efficiency  gains  to any  voluntsry  participation
open-market buyback never  exceed the  gains reaped by  creditors was  first
demonstrated  in  Bulow  and  Rogoff (1991). One  can  easily  extend  the  propositiorn,
via continuity,  to prove that a highly indebted  country always  benefits (up  to
a point)  from  "reverse  buybacks",  that is,  new loans at default  risk adjusted
market  interest  rates.
5plausible)  assumptions  that  will be clarified  shortly. 3
2.1  Open-Market  Buybacks  in the Absence  of Efficiency  Effects
The simplest case is one in which a buyback has no adverse incentive
effects on the debtor's investment decisions.  In  this case, whatever  the
creditors gain from a buyback, the debtor  must lose (and vice-versa).  If we
denote  the average  secondary  market  price of a country's  debt as P0 o 4 the price
that  prevails  after  an open-market  buyback  of debt as  P 1 and  Do as the initial
level  of indebtedness,  'then
N Creditors'  Gain (Loss)  (P1 - PO)DO,  (l}
where the  right-hand side is the capital gain on debt outstanding  before the
buyback.  To derive  this  relationship,  note that creditors  who do not sell gain
(plM  - PO)D 1,  where D1 is  the  post-buyback  level  of  debt.  But  if debt is tendered
voluntarily  --  the central characteristic  of the open-market  buyback --  then
creditors  who sell  must be exactly  as  well off  as creditors  who do not sell.  If
V(D) denotes  the market  value of a debt of total  value D, and  X the amount  the
debtor  spends  on the  buyback,  then the condition  for  market  equilibrium  is:  X =
(Do  - D1)P1M, and p1M - V(D 1)/D 1,  the average  value of debt after the buyback.
Combining  this cash outlay  of the  buyback  with the  gain to creditors  who do not
sell and after netting out the previous value of  debt tendered: P0(Do - DI)
yields  expression  (1). Since  there  is  no efficiency  gain,  the  country's  loss in
the  buyback  is the  negative  of (1). For  later  discussion,  one can  alternatively
3  In an interesting  paper,  Divan and  Spiegel (1992)  argue  that  menu-driven
buybacks may benefit a country by taking advantage of an illiquid secondary
market for sovereign debt.  The consequence  of an illiquid  market may be to
increase  or reduce  the differential  between the pre- and  post-buyback  price of
debt, and therefore their effect on the bounds derived in this section is
ambiguous.
4 It is helpful for now to think of there as being just one class of
creditors; if there is more than one class of creditors then P denotes the
average  secondary  market  price,  weighted by debt outstanding.
6It  -- s 
express  this  loss  as:
Debtor's  Loss  from  Buyback  In  the  Ab:ence  of  Efficiency  Gains
(2)
V(D1)  + X - V(DO)  - (PF  -Po)Do  - Gain  to  Creditors,
by making use of the market equilibrium  condition  and the definition of debt
price.
Must it be that the price of debt rises after the buyback: 1'M  >  Po.
debtors always lose?  Consider a simple model in which creditors are able to
bargain for up to q percent of the country's random  output  Y.  The value of a
country's  debt is then  the  minimum  of  qY and the  face  value  of debt  D  in  expected
value terms:  V(D)  - min (qY,D). It is the  expected  value  of repayments  in  states
of nature where the country defaults, and the repayments in states where the
country  repays  in full.  Consider  the  costs  and  benefits  of a small  buyback:  The
cost is  the  average  value  of debt:  V(D)ID,  since  creditors  will only  tender  their
debt if  they are  paid as  much as they  expect  to get if  they do  not sell.  BEt  the
benefit in terms of lower expected future repayments  (remember  we are not yet
allowing  for efficiency  effects)  is given by the  marginal  value of debt:  V'(D)
which is defined  by the probability  of the good states  of nature in which the
country  makes payments  to its  external  creditors.
Thus the cost of a dollar  of debt reduction,  the average  value of debt P,
is  greater  than the  benefit,  the  marginal  value  of debt  V'  (D). The intuition  for
this result, 5 which is easily shown  to hold in this example for large buybacks
as well, is as follows: in the absence of efficiency  gains, a  country only
benefits  from  a lower face  value  of its debt in states  of nature  where it  would
otherwise  have  paid in full. But to induce  an individual  creditor  to tender  his
debt, the country  must also compensate  the creditor  for payments  he would have
received  in the event of partial default.
5  This result  was first  derived  in Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988);  for  the related
result  in  a  more complex  bargaining  theoretic  model  of  debt,  see  Bulow  and  Rogoff
(1989a,  1989b  and 1990).
7If  there  were no mfficiency  benefits to debt restructuring, it  would be
also  a relatively  simple  matter to calculate  the gain or loss  to country  from a
much more complex deal.'  Essentially,  all one  would have to do is to calculate
the total  value of creditors  claims  before  the  buyback,  and compare it  with the
total value of creditors claims after the buyback, inclusive of any cash tlhe
country pays out for the repurchase.  That is,
In  theo  Absence  of  Efficiency  Effects,  Cost  (Benefit)  co  a  Debcor
from  a Debt  Restructuring  *  V(D1)  + N - V(DO)  - P 1D1 - PODo  + N,
where  N  is the  country's cash outlay  (which may  be  negativs if the  debt
restructuring  provides for new loans or aid).  The above equation  embodies the
assumption  that from  the country's  point of view, the  burden  of debt depends on
the total amount of money owed, and not on how the dent is divided up into
seniority  classes;  this assumption  is not crucial for  our later  calculations  as
long as there are no efficiency gains from any source.  The main practical
complication posed by the existence of different classes of debt is that the
calculation of V(D) becomes more involved,  but as we shall later demonstrate,
these complications  can be surmounted. 6
Thus far, we have assumed that a buyback does not have any efficiency
consequences. If there  are  efficiency  benefits  to  a  debt  restructuring,  then  the
loss given  by equation (3)  represents  a lower bound on the gain to a country  of
the  restructuring. With efficiency  effects,  it is posoible for  both the  debtor
and the creditor  to gain from the restructuring. To calculate  exact estimates
of the efficiency  benefits from restructuring,  it is necessary to develop and
parameterize a model of the investment,  output  and repayments.  We will tackle
this  task later, though clearly it will  be necessary to make a number of
assumptions to parameterize a model  of debt overhang.  But  even absent a
structural  model, it turns  out to be possible  to  bound  the efficiency  effects  ex
6 Official debt, if it is senior or equal priority, does present some
problems because there is no meaningfutl  market price; we consider this issue
later.
8Before  leaving  the  case  where output  is  exogenous,  it is  useful  to  note one
very important feature of the debt value functiot.  given by min(qY,D).  It is
concave  in  Y, so a  rise in the  variance  of  Y (more  precisely  an increase  in  mean-
preserving spread),  necessarily lovers  the  value of debt.  Note that in Figure
1, with Y on the horizontal axis and the debt value function on the vertical
axis, the  function  rises  with slope  q  untiLl  Y  =DIq  and  then  becomes  a  horizontal
*line  at D.




9Thi  is the standard  result  in option  pricing:  debt offers  the  country  the
opinof  pArtially  defaulting. A rise in the  variance  of the  underlying
.asset  (the  country's  output)  raises  the  value  of  this  option  and  therefore
-lowers  the  value of the debt  to creditors. -As  we shall  see later,  this
standard  option~  pricing  intuition  does  not necessarily  follow  once one  allows
for  moral  hazard  in investment.
2.2  Open-Market  Buybacks  in the Presence  of Debt Overhang
The foregoing  analysis  ignores  any  efficiency  gains  a country  might
enjoy  as a result  of debt reduction. Isn't  it possible  that  these  efficiency
effects  may be so large  as to cancel  out  the losses  from  a buyback  given  by
equation  (2)? As we have already  indicated,  the  answer  to this question  turns
out  to be-no u-nder  a fairly  broad range  of assumptions. If this seems
surprising,  the  following  intuition  may be helpful:  If an open-market  buyback
indeed  ameliorates  debt  overhang  and induces  a country  to  move to a higher  and
*  more efficient  level  of investment,  creditors  will anticipate  this in deciding
* hait  price  they  -require  to remit  their  claims. So at least  part of the
*efficiency  gains  will necessarily  be dissipated  in additional  capital  gains  to
* creditors.
*  ~~The  basic  assumptions  necessary  to prove  that  buaybacks  do not benefit
creditors  are derived  in Bulaw  and Rogoff (1991). Sufficient  conditions  are
that new investment  must increase  output  proportionately  across  states  of
nature,  and that as a country's  consumption,  investment  and debt  double,  the
ability  of creditors  to extract  repayments  no more than doubles. That is,
large  countries  do-not  pay relatively  more than smaller  countries.  These  are
sufficient  conditions,  but they  are  not necessary. In general,  a buyback
cannot  benefit  a debtor  unless  the  marginal  value of debt is quite  close  to
the  pr-ice,  and the  marginal  tax  rate on new investment  is very hiLgh. 7
If one accepts  the  proposition  that a cou-ntry  does  not benefit  from a
7  For a  more complete  discussion,  see Bulow  and  Rogoff (1991).
10*straight  open-market  repurchasA,of  debt,,then  it.  is possible  to use the ex
post average  price of debt to place  an upper bound  on the benefit  to the
country  and, in conjunction  with (3),  on the potential  efficiency.gain. The
key to constructing  the bound  on efficiency  gains  is to note a straight  open-
market  buyback  operation  is at best a break-even  deal  for a debtor  country,
then
Efficiency  Gain  to  an  Open-Market  Bzzyback
Gain  to  Creditors  =  (P 1
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O  -- e 
Of course,  PlM is a hypothetical  price  corresponding  to  'what  the average
seconda-ry  market  price of debt  would 'aave  been had the  country  conducted  a
buyback  instead  of a negotiated  deal.  Note that the  actual  price that
prevails  after  a negotiated  debt  deal,  PlN,  will in  general  be at least  as
great  as the  price that  would  have prevailed  after a straight  mr:ket
repurchase  that reduces  the face  value of debt  by,the  same  amount:  PINM>  p1N*
The reason  this  must hold is that a negotiated  repurchase  allows  a country  to
reduce  debt at lower  cost than in a buyback.  Because  the  debtor  retains  more
assets  (it  spends  less),  creditors  can in general  expect  higher  expected
future  repayments  after  a negotiated  deal. 8 As a corolla-ry  of this,  we
have: 9
Efficiency  Gain  to  a  Negotiated  Buyback  s (P. 1 - P0)D 0. (5)
Nqote  that (PlN~ - PD)DO  is not the gain to creditors  in a large  negotiated
buyback.  In general,  they receive  less than PIN per dollar  of debt
repurchased  --  the essence  of a negotiated  deal is that the  debtor  pays
something  closer  to  marginal  value of debt..
8 O'Connell (1988)  argues that higher reserves  may improve a country's
bargaining  position and thereby actually  lower repayments.  If this were the
case,  then our  bounds  would tend to somewhat  overstate  the  efficiency  gains.
9  Note that it is not  necessarily  easy to calculate  Po  due  to expectations
of buyback.
11~~~~~~~~~~~4As a first  pass,  we apply  the  bounds  derived  in (5)  to actual  Brady  Plan
deals  of five countries:  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  Costa  Rica,  Venezuela  and
Uruguay.  The  bound derived  i-n  (5)  is  an upper  bound  to the total  efficiency
,..gain  (i.e.  aggregating  creditors  and the  country). Bulow  and Rogoff  (1991)
give a tighter  bound  to the  country's  gain in the presence  of debt overhang
effect.  Clatessens,  Divan  and Fernandez-Arias  (1993)  derived  an alternative
measure of creditor  banks'  gain  based  on implied  secondary  market  prices  of
structural  models. We report  their  estimates  ifl  column  (h)  of Table  1.
We have already  argued  that a lower  bound  on the  gain a country  enjoys
from a large  negotiated  deal  is given  by creditors'  gain; the lower  bound  is
derived  under-the  assumption  that there  are  no efficiency  benefits  to debt
reduction.  Since  the gain to creditors  in a  market  buyback  of comparable  size
is the upper  bound  on the total  efficiency  gain in any debt reduction  deal,
the  net gain to a country  from  a negotiated  restructuring  deal is simply  equal
to the  upper  bound on the  efficiency  gain (5)  minus creditors'  capital  gain
(3):1D
Net:  Gain  to  Debtor  Erom  a  Large  Negotiated  Buzyback  (
_  N~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5(PN  - P. 0)D 0 - (PiTDh  - P0D 0 + N)  = P,  (Do  - DI)  - N.
A key -issue  in empirical  implementation  is  how to take account  of
official  debt,  for  which there  are  no secondary  market  prices.  Temporarily,
we will simplify  matters  by treating  official  debt as implicitly  junior  to
private  debt.  It is  not our  intention  to takc;  a strong  stand  on this  issue
here; the  evidence  is  -mixed. 11 We take  up this  ease first  simply  because  it
is the easiest;  later  we will investigate  how  altering  the assumed  seniority
structure  mAay  increase  or decrease  the  estimated  efficiency  bounds. Column
10  If the value of total stock of debt rises after the buyback:  V(D 1 ) >
V(D1 0), then there  must be an efficiency  gain of at least the increase  in debt
value:  V(DX)  - V(D 0).
''  For discussions  of  the  relative  seniority  of  official  debt,  see  Bulaw  and
Rogoff (1988),  (1990),  and  Bulow,  Rogoff  and  Bevilaqua  (1992).
12*.t (a)  of Table 1  gives  upper  bounds  to efficiency  gains  from  the combined
perspective  of the country  and its official  creditors,  i.e.,  under the
assumption  that official  debt is aid.  The estimates  given in columns (f)  and
(g)  correspond  to alternative  seniority  assumptions  on official  debt.
Table  1.  Upper  Bounds  on the  Total  Efficiency  Gains
(a)  P0. (b)  P1 (c)  Do  (d)  CBO  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)
Mexico  0.36  0.52  95.40  47.20  7.60  15.30  61.10  2.36
Philippines 0.40  0.52  28.50  6.60  0.80  3.40  17.10  0.40
Costa  Rica  0.12  0.39  4.60  1.60  0.40  1.20  4.00  0.19
Venezuela  0.37  0.61  33.30  19.00  4.60  8.00  21.00  2.47
Uruguay  0.56  0.74  4.30  1.60  0.30  0.30  1.90  0.06
Sources:  World Debt Tables and  Cloessens,  Dimen  and  Fernandez-Arias  (1992).
Definition  of  cotumns:
(a)  Debt  price  before  the  deaL;
(b)  Debt  price  after  the  deal;
Cc)  TotaL  debt  outstanding  in  USS  biLlions  before  the  deal;
Cd)  Commercial  bank  debt  in  USS  bilLions;
Ce)  Upper  bound  on  the  gain  when  officiat  debt  is  junior  to  comnercial  debt;
(f)  Upper  bound  an  the  gain  when  official  debt  is  equwL  priority  debt;
(g)  Maxiu.m  efficiency  gain,  i.e.,  when  price  of  debt  rises  to  par;
Ch)  Commercial  banks'  gain.
2.3  Modifying the Bounds For the Case Where Official Debt Is Equal
Prority  or Senior to Private Debt
Using secondary  market  prices  for seventeen  heavily indebted  countries
for  the  years 1986-1991,  Bulow,  Rogoff  and  Bevilaqua (1992)  find that one
cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that official  debt and private  debt are equal
priority;  that is, that the expected  rate  of repayment  is the  same for  both.
Suppose  we adopt  this assumption  instead  of treating  official  debt as junior.
How would  this  modify  the  bounds  derived  in the  preceding  subsection? Let do
denote  the initial  level  of official  debt,  so that a country's  total  initial
debt  is DOdO.  If official  and  private debt are  equal  priority,  then both
private  and official  creditors  enjoy the  same capital  gain from a straight
open-market  buyback.  Thus, the  total gain  to creditors  of a straight  open-
market  buyback  is-now  given  by:
13Total  Gain  to  Prlvate  and  Official  Creditors  from
an  Open-market  Buyback  when  Debt  is  Equal  Priority  (7)
*(P  - PO)(Do  i  do).
Our theorem that open-market  buybacks  do not benefit a debtor  still goes
through in the case  where official  creditors  have equal priority.  Thus the
right-hand  side of (7)  provides  an upper bound to the efficiency  gains from a
buyback, and an upper bound to the efficiency  gains in a negotiated  buyback is
given  by:
Efficiency  Gains  to  a Negotlated  Buybarck
(8,
- (PV  - PO)(Do  0 do)  9 ('  - PO) (DD  do).
Comparing (8)  and (5),  we see that allowing  for the possibility  that official
debt is equal  priority considerably  raises  the upper bound on the efficiency
gain.  If a country  is to break even on a buyback,  the efficiency  gain must
now compensate  it both for the capital  gains to private creditors  and for the
capital gains to official  creditors.  Columns (f) and (g)  of Table I  provide
alternative  estimates  of  the  aggregate  gains  and  losses  to  participants  from
Brady  Plan  deals.  Note  that  the  gain  to  banks  is  the  same,  and  the  gain  to
o  official  creditors  is  similarly  straightforward  to  calculate.  The  upper  bound
to  the  country's  gain  is  simply  the  difference  between  the  maximum  efficiency
gain  (8)  minus  the  gain  realized  by  creditors.
What  if  instead  of  being  equal  priority,  official  creditors  are  in  fact
senior?  The  formula  for  determining  the  net  benefits  to  creditors  still
applies,  but  now  P  must  be  replaced  by  a  weighted average of the price of
official  debt  and  private debt.  We denote  the average  market  price  of  a
country's  debt  as  Q, which  is an  average  of  the  price  of  official  debt  pd  and
the  price of commercial  debt  p: Q  zPd  +  (1-z)P,  weighted  by the fraction  of
14official  debt in total debt:  z. 12 Of course,  in order  to calculate  the
average  price Q  it is necessary  to have an estimate  of the  price of official
debt,  pd,  For simplicity.,  we will assume  that the total  quantity  of official
loans  is small enough  so that pd  - 1.  In this case, the  upper  bound on the
efficiency  gain to a debt restructuring  is given  by: 13
Upper  Bound  on  Efficiency  Gain  from  a  Debt  Buyback  (9)
When  Official  Debt  is  Strict  Senior  =  (Q 1 - QC)  (Do  + do).
It is easy to show that for  any given debt reduction  deal,  the bound
given  by (9)  may be greater  than or less than the efficiency  bound given  by
(8)  for the  case  where official  debt is equal  priority.  Consider,  for
example,  the case  where a debt restructuring  leads  to an increase  in official
debt and a decrease  in privately-held  debt,  and  where the initial  level  of
official  debt is zero.  Note from the definition  of debt  prices  that dQ - z
dPd  +  (1-z)  dP  +  (Pd  - P) dz.  By assumption,  Ad  Pd  - 0 if the official  debt is
always  small  enough  so  that  it  is  valued  at  par.  If  the  initial  share  of
official  debt  z is zero, then clearly  dQ >  dP if  dz  >  0.  This  clearly  implies
Qi  - Qo  >  Pl  - P'.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  share  of  private  debt  is
sufficiently  small,  then  the  upper  bound  given  by  (9)  will  be  lower  than  that
given  by  (8).
Note that our  formula  for the  upper  bound on the  efficiency  gains  tells
us that no type of debt restructuring  deal --  even one  where all  creditors
walk away from their  claims  voluntarily  --  can yield an efficiency  gain
greater  than the  maximum  possible  capital  gain to creditors,  or Maximum
Attainable  Efficiency  Gain  - (1  - P0) (Do  +  do).  For most countries,  this
upper  bound can  be quite large;  Column (g)  of Table 1 lists  the  upper  bound on
12 Formally,  Q - V(DD+d)/(D+d)  z  CV(d)Id]  +  (1-z)  (V(D+d)-V(d)]/D,  where  V(d)
here equals  the  value of  the  d dollars  of senior  official  debt  holding  the level
of investment  constant  or equivalently  given  total  debt of (D+d).
13 The change  in the  price of total  debt can  also be expressed  as Q1  - Qb  -
(P 1D1+dl)/(Dl+d 1) - (P 0Dotdo)/tDo(do).
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attainable  efficiency  gains  for some major Brady Plan countries under the
equal priority  assumption.
2.4  Applying the Efficiency Bounds to Analyze New Loan Packages
The ssme logic that suggests  that open-market  buybacks  do not benefit a
country  can be reversed  to show that a highly indebted  country  gains from new
borrowing even if it is forced  to pay the  market default risk premium. 14 In
most cases,  of course, equal sharing clauses  make reverse buybacks impossible
since  a  country cannot  pay a new lender  a  much larger interest  rate.  But even
though  reverse buybacks  may appear  to have limited  practical relevance, 15
this conceptual  construct  will help place bounds  on the efficiency  effects  of
more complex  lending packages.
The derivation  of the bounds  for reverse  buybacks is quite similar  to
the case of buybacks  but there are slight differences  and it  will be helpful
to briefly dlscuss  them.  In our fictitious  reverse  buyback operation,  a
country  receives  X  dollars  from new lenders  in return  for D 1 - Do  worth of
face  value  debt.  In  order  for  new  lenders  to  be  willing  to  participate  in  the
loan  package,  it  is  necessary  that:  X  - (D 1 - DO)P1,  where  P 1 - V(D1)/D1 is  the
average  price  of  debt.  Note  that  for  every  dollar  they  are  asked  to
contribute,  new  lenders  are  given  liP 1 >  I  in  -face  value  debt.  Thus  new
lenders  break even.  AssumIng that the price of the debt falls,  however,
existing lenders  suffer  a  capital loss of (P 1 -PO)DO,  which  is the same  as in
expression (1)  except  here the sign of (P 1 - PO)  is reversed.  Thus the
country  gains because the new loan inflicts  capital  losses  on existing
credltors.  Because debt overhang  efficiency  effects are exacerbated  rather
than alleviated  in a  reverse  buyback, condition (1)  now represents  an upper
14  The  result only holds for sufficiently small reverse buybacks; the
country  does not necessarily  benefit if the new loan is so large that country
cannot  profitably invest  the funds.
15  Some equity swaps  might be construed  as reverse  buybacks.
16bound on the gains to the country,  rather than a lower  bound.  16 It also
gives the  upper bound on debt overhang  efficiency  losses.
As an illustration,  we consider  the case of a debt restructuring  plan
*  ~that  involves  significant  new loans  for a stylized  country that has not
*  ~previously  received  much  Western assistance  (Table  2).  In our calculations  we
assume that official  debt is equal priority,  and  we consider  three alternative
ex post prices and compare the  possible  benefits  and efficiency  losses.
Table  2.  The  Capital  Gain  of  Alternative  Loan  Packages
(a)  Po  (b)  Do  (c)  (d)
P1  =  0.35  0.42  67-2  4.7  28.2
Pl  0.30  0.42  67.2  8.1  28.2
P1 =  0.25  0.42  67.2  11.4  28.2
Sources:  Stylized  numbers for  a  Large middle-income  country.
Definition  of  coltars:
Ca) Debt price  before  the  deal;
cb)  Total  debt  outstaniding  in  US$  biLLions  before  the  deaL;
cc)  upper  bound  on  the  gain  when  officiaL  debt  is  equaL  priority  debt;
Cd)  Maximum  efficiency  gain,  i.e.,  when  price  of  debt  faLls  to  zero.
3  Obtaining Point Estimates of Efficiency Gains, Ex-Post and Ex-Ante
We have been able to say  quite a bit about a broad range of debt
reduction operations,  and even new lending  initiatives,  using only the simple
proposition  that a debtor  country  would not benefit from trying  to reduce  debt
through straight  open-market  buybacks  alone.  To go further  --  to give point
estimates to efficiency  gains,  to make  e  ante predictions,  and to develop the
comparative  static  results  needed to evaluate  alternative  loan packages --  it
is necessary to develop a  more fully articulated  model.
In a companion  paper (Bulow,  Rogoff and  Zhu (1994)),  we employ  a fairly
16 A  reverse buyback can make a count-ry  worse off if it -is  sufficiently
large that there is no productive  use for the new funds.
17stnard  model of debt overhang  and  investment  and  show-that  in certain  cases,
it is possible  to derive  a closed-form  solution,  which is tantamount  to
solving  a problem  involving  option  .pricing  with moral hazard. 17 Implementing
the  model does,  of course,  require  obtaining  estimates  of the key parameters;
we offer  some sample  calculations  for  five debt reduction  deals,  both ex ante
and ex post.  But  perhaps  the  main interest  of our approach  is that it enables
one to tackle  a number  of issues  concerning  the  structuring  of loan  packages
in a  relatively  simple  and transparent  way.
3.1 A Simple  Model of Debt Overhang  and Investment
The  miodel  is a simple  version  of the standard  two-period  model of debt
overhang. 18 '  The five-stage  timing  of events  is as follows:  In the first
stage,  a  -small  country  inherits  a debt Do,  and an  .initial  level  of resources
W10. In the  second  stage,  it negotiates  a debt deal  with its  public  and
private creditors;  it may also receiLve  aid  at this stage.  In the third  stage
it  chooses  how  to allocate  its  resources  between  current  cons  mtion  and
investment.-  In the fourth  stage,  exogenous  shocks  to the country's  production
are revealed,d  and in the fifth  and final  stage  the country  produces,  consumes
and makes (possiblyl  t  aitial)  repayments  to creditors.
All,  lenders  are able to diversify  risks  in the internationLal  capital
market and  thus-are  taken  as being  risk  neutral for simplicity. The country's
gross income  is then given  by the sum  of its first-period  consumption  and the
second-period  output. Alcentral  assumption  in this debt  overhang  model is
that the country's  own  resources  are insufficient  to achieve  the globally,
17o  I  is well known that sovereign  debt can be thought of in an option
pricing  framework;  see  Saunders  (1986),  Genotte,  Xharas  and  Sadeq  (.1987)  and  more
recently  Claesseins  andvan  Wijnbergen  (1993a,  1993b). These  earlier  analyses,
however,  do  not take into account  the  moral  hazard  in investment  problem,  as is
also universally  the  case in the  domestic  debt  option  literature. Allowing  for
moral  hazard-  turns  out-to  have  important  qualitative  Implications  for  the  effects
of increase  in risk on the  value of.-debt  V(D).
a See Bulow,  Rogoff  and  Zhu (1994).
18efficient  level  of investment,  i.e.,  the  marginal  product of investing  all
resources  is greater  than 1 if both the  riskless  interest  rate  and the
country's  internal  rate-of  time  pteference  are assumed  to be zero.  Nothing
important  hinges  on these  assumptions. Given that the riskless  interest  rate
is zero, the  country  would investiup  to the point  where investment  returns
equal  to 1 in  the  absence  of default  risk.
Lenders cannot  necessarily  force  the country  to repay its  debts  in full
in states  of nature  where its  output  turns  out to be too low.  Once investment
returns  are realized  in stage-  4, creditors  are  able to extract  repayments
equal to a  fraction:  q  percent  of the country's  future  uncertain  output  Y up
to the limit  of the contractual  value of debt service  payments.  Under  this
expropriation  technology  by creditors,  the "tax"  on current  consumption  is
zero,  and the  returns  from future  investment  are taxed at a constant  rate q;
these assumptions  capture  the  key point that  creditors  generally  gain more
when the country  invests  in growth  than  when it consumes.  Froot (1989)  and
Krugman (1989)  assume  a "gunboat"  technology  which expropriate  all of the
country's  future  output  in case of default,  i.e.,  q =  1.  Here,  however,  we
allow for  the  more general  and realistic  case of partial  expropriation. As
Bulow and  Rogoff (1988)  argue,  the empirical  evidence  strongly  suggests  that -
creditors  can  generally  bargain for  only a fraction  of any gains from  higher
outcomes. Given this  partial expropriation  assumption,  the  country's  expected
future  payments  to creditors  V(D;I)  can  be expressed  as the  minimumnof  qY and
D.
This is, of course,  analogous  to our earlier  definition  of the debt
value function  for the  case  where there  was no investment  decision. The
essential  difference  here is that investment  is a choice  variable  for the
country  that  will depend  on debt  D, the  margina'l  tax  rate-'on  investment  q, and
the total  resources  available  for  investment  and consumption.
The country's  objective  is to  maximize  the  present  value  of two-period
consumption,  net of repayments  to creditors:  maximize  W =  C + E(Y) - V.
Recall  that  we have assumed  that the country's  internal  rate of  time
preference  is zero,  and  we have assumed  that the debtor  is also risk  neutral;
19allowing  for  risk aversion  would complicate  the analysis  without adding  any
important  new insights. 19
The  key step in solving  the  model is to formulate  the country's
investment  decision  given  the stock  of external  debt D and the initial
resources  WO.  Once  we have  the investment  function  I, it is straightforward
to work backwards  to solve  for  the  value of debt V(D;I),  and for the price  a
country  would have to pay in a buyback.  Once  D and  WO  are set, the debtor's
budget  constraint  is given  simply  by WO - C +  I.  The critical  first-order
condition  that governs  the country's  choice  of investment  is characterized  by
the fact  that the  debtor  invests  up to the point  where the  marginal  expected
return  on investment,  net of the  expected  tax  paid to foreign  creditors,  must
equal  the  return  on currert  consumption.
3.2  Comparative Statics of Debt Overhang and Investment
It is helpful to study  some  general  characteristics  of the country's
first-order  condition  before  looking  at closed-form  solutions  to the  model.
First,  the  expected  tax paid to creditors  is captured  by the tax  rate q and  a
threshold  value of shocks  which  uniquely  defines  the  bad states  of nature:  the
higher  is the threshold  value of shocks,  the  more likely  the country  will not
be able to  make payments  to creditors. In  what follows,  we refer to t'is
factor  as the debt overhang  effect. At the first  sight,  the  effect  of higher
debt on investment  decision  is seemingly  ambiguous. As debt rises,  the
marginal  tax on investment  rises. A rise in investment  lowers  the  marginal
product  of investment,  but also lowers  the critical  value of shocks  which has
an offsetting  effect. However,  it is straightforward  to see that the second-
order  condition  requires  that the  debt overhang  effect  to be negative. That
is,  the  marginal  value of debt is less  in the case  with moral hazard  of
19  The most important qualification  is that when the debtor's utility
function  is  concave  in second-period  income,  then  having  a  higher  debt  may cause
it to invest  more rather  than less (the  income  effect  of the "tax"  on  marginal
investment  exceeds  the  substitution  effect;  see  Helpman  (1991)). We assume  that
the debt overhang  effect  works in the normal  way; otherwise  there  would be no
efficiency  rationale  for debt  reduction.
20investment  than  without.  Otherwise,  we would obtain  the  perverse  case of a
seve-rely  indebted  country  inventing  all the  way to a  corner  solution.
Some sharper  results  can be derived  from closed-form  solutions  of the
first-order  condition. The first  major  result  Bulow 1 Rogoff  and Zhu (1994)
obtained  is:  A mean-preserving  increase  in the  variance  of productivity  shocks
may lead  to an increase  rather  than  decrease  in the  value of debt to
creditors.
Recall  that in Figure  1  of the  fixed investment  model in section  2, a
mean-preserving  spread  increase  in the  volatility  of shocks  unambiguously
lowered  the  value of debt  because  it raised  the  value to the country  of the
option  to default.  Hlere,  however,  a rise in the  volatility  of shocks  may
increase  the country's  incentives  to invest  and thereby  lead to an efficiency
gain.  Why  right an increase  in the  variance  of shocks  lead to an increase  in
investment? Because  very good  realizations  of the  uncertainty  are not taxed;
once the country  has paid its  debt in full,  there is  no debt overhang. Bad
realizations  of the  uncertainty  are  taxed,  but the  average  tax rate  on
investment  may easily  fall.  For  given investment,  greater  variance  reduces
the average  tax rate  on investment  and therefore  the  value  of debt,  which
harts creditors. But the  greater  variance  may also  reduce  the  marginal  tax
rate on investment. If the  marginal  product  of investment  is sufficiently
flat so that the lower  marginal  rate generates  enough  extra  investment,  the
extra  variance  can raise  the  value of debt.
With the aid  of a closed-form  solution,  it is fairly  straightforward  to
confirm  our earlier  discussion  that inacreases  in debt damp investment  and,
similarly,  increases  in expected  productivity  raise  investment. An
interesting  question  is  whether investment  in highly  indebted  countries  is
mare or less elastic  with respect  to changes  in productivity  than investment
in countries  that  are not in debt  difficulties. Some intuition  can be gained
by examining  the  first-order  condition  of the country's  -problem,  which
maintains  that a debtor  country  allocates  resources  by trading  off the
expected  return  on investment,  net of "tax"  paid to external  creditors  (i.e.,
the debt  overhang  effect),  with current  consumption.
21An increa-se  In  productivity  raises  returns  on investment,  and the
subsequent  rise in investment  causes  the threshold  value of shocks  to fall.
Therefore  the  elasticity  of investment  with respect  to productivity  chings.
hinges  on bow "elastic"  the  debt overhang  factor  is  with respect  to the
threshold  value  of shocks. Unless  the  probability  density  function  falls
rapidly,:the  elasticity  is higher  when the threshold  value of shocks  is
higher.  Thi.s  is simply  to say that the  debt  overhang  problem  is  most
pronounced  for  a country  that is so far  in debt that the probability  of full
repayment  is almost  zero.  Thus for  extremely  highly  indebted  countries,  one
should  expect  that  not only  will the  mean level  of investment  be lower  than it
would be otherwise,  but  the  volatility  of investment  must also  be higher.  On
the other  hand,  f  or countries  that have  a very high probability  of repayment,
the effective  tax on investment  is relatively  low and the  elasticities  are
lover.  Investment  in "rich"  debtor  countries  is likely  to exhibit  lover
rather  than higher  variance. 20
This analytical  result  has interesting  implications  for  empirical
research  on debt  and investment. Most recent  empirical  studies  have looked  at
time series,  data  and tried  to explain  the  sharp  decline  in the  level  of
developing  country  investment  in the  early 1980s. It would  be interesting  to
test the  hypothesis  that investment  volatility  falls  as the  price  of debt
rises in c-ross-section  data.  A related  prediction  is that as former  Soviet
Bloc countries.  become  more heavily  indebted,  the  volatility  of their
investment  will rise.
Interestingly,  one  can also intuit  from  the first-order  condition  that
the effect  of a toughening  of debt enforcement  on investment  is also
ambiguous.  It  might seem  obvious  that  as creditors'  ability  to bargain  for a
larger  share of output  increases,  the tax on investment  -will  rise and
20  We focus  on the first-order  effect  of higher  debt on the likelihood  of
default. As our  mode  endogenizes  investment  decision,  one  should  also  take  into
account  the moral hazard aspect  of investment  in determining  the elasticity.
However,  the  second-order  condition  predicts  that  this effect  is reinfcrcing  as
a higher  debt depresses  investment  thus increases  the  default  probability  even
higher.
22investment  will fall,  -at least  in defaulting  states  of  nature. But again
reference  to the  first-order  condition  shows  that  this is not  necessaLrily  the
case.  Because  a higher  marginal  tax  rate lowers  the  threshold  level  of
shocks,  it makes  default  less  likely,  and  thus  implies  a higher  probability  of
full repayment. This effect  tends  to lower  the  expected  tax  on investmenit  by
raising  the  probability  of full repayment. Which  factor  dominates: 21 the
debt overhang  effect  in the  bad states  of nature,  or the fact  that  increases
in the  marginal  tax  rate  lower  the  expected  tax  by raising  the  probability  of
full  repayment? The  overall  effect  on investment  is  not determinate,  as it
turns  out  that  the second  order  conditions  do  not rule out  the  possibility
that  a higher  marginal  tax  rate increases  investment. This is largely  an
empirical  question,  aud  the  model studied  here-sheds  some light  onbthe  issue.
If the  realizations  of the  productivity  shock  are  uniformly  distributed,
more stringent  enforcement  by creditors  actually  lowers  the  marginal  tax  rate
paid by the  debtor  and raises  investment. However,  if the  probability  mass
for the  productivity  shock  is heavily  weighted  towards  the  bad states  of
nature,  then  it is likely  that a rise  in the  margi-nal  tax rate  will lower
investment. It is also  the case  that the  more likely  the full  repayment,  the
more likely  that  a rise in the  marginal  tax  rate  will raise  investment. This
harkens  back to our  earlier  discussion  of productivity  changes:  For  vary
heavily  indebted  countries,  harsher  enforcement  of debt  repayments  will
clearly  raise  the tax  orn  investment  and  exacerbate  debt  overhang  inefficiency.
For countries  that  are doing  sufficiently  well,  however,  a strengthening  of
legal  systems  governing  bankruptcy  will  generally  raise  investment. We shall
return  to this issue  in thinking  abott  the implications  of the  model for  how
to structure  Brady  Plan deals  and  new lending  packages  to countries  that  have
not previously  reteived  western financial  assistance.
3.3  Point Estimates of Debt  Reduction Deals
21  If the  greater  enforcement  is not accompanied  by aid, then,  of course,
the country's  welfare  falls.
23How can one  make use of the  closed-form  solutions  of the model to
-improve  upon the  results  from section  2?  One key result  there  was  that the
upper bound  on the efficiency  gain from any debt reduction  deal is given by
the capital gain on the stock of debt before the buyback:  (PlN  - +
where P 1m is the price of debt that  would have prevailed  if debt reduction  had
been achieved  via an open-market.  operation  rather  than a negotiated  debt
reduction. We are taking  as our baseline  the case  where official  debt is
equal  priority  whLich  we showed  generally  leads to the  highest  efficiency  gain
estimates.
But this is an upper  bound.  With our closed-form  solutions,  we can give
more precise  estimates.  First,  in Table 3,  we revisit  the  Brady Plan deals  we
looked  at earlier  by providing  point  estimates  based  onn  the Pareto
* distribution  of the productivity  shock.  The five economies  are simulated  by a
simple  Cobb-Douglas  type of "production  function"  and calibrated  by the latest
macroeconomic  data for the countries.
Table 3 presents  both the upper  bound efficiency  estimate  and the  point
estimate  derived  from our  model  --  In the case of Mexico,  for example,  the
upper  bound efficiency  estimate  to the Brady Plan deal is  US$15 billion  but
our point  estimate  is only  US$1  billion.  It is important  to note the
qualificution  that no new loans  are permitted. Allowing  for  new loans  would
raise  the efficiency  estimates  provided  sufficient  positive  present  value
projects  were available.  But  Table 3 illustrates  that the  debt overhang  tax
itself  may not be as important  as the broader  problem  that debtors  are credit
constrained  in international  capital  market.  The implication  that our point
estimates  for the efficiency  gains  are far below  our upper  bound estimates  is
that the  upper bounds  considerably  overstate  the  debt overhang  problem.  Why
should  this be the case?  In parameterizing  the  model, it is  necessary to
choose  a  value of the marginal  tax rate low enough  to explain  actual  secondary
market  prices.  But with the  marginal  tax rate being relatively  small,  the tax
on average  and therefore  marginal  investment  cannot  be that large either.  In
Table 3,  we also calculate  the efficiency  gains  that would  be achieved  if both
official  and  private creditors  were to write off  half of their debts,
24contingent  on no further  bor-rowing. 22
Table  3.  Point  Estimates  of  the  Total  Efficiency  Gain
Brady Plan Deals  Upper Bound  on Gains
------------------ if  All Creditors  Would
Estimate  Upper  Bound  Write off half  of Debt
R-  ~~  a  ema  ssa  sass
Mexico  934  15,300  8,675
Philippines  59  3,400  929
Costa  Rica  27  1,200  77
Venezuela  130  8,000  1,592
Uruguay  56  800  267
Sources:  WorLd  Debt  robtes  and  authors'  calcuLation.
ALL  numbers  are  in  USS  miLlions.
3.4  The Indu  ced Efficiency Effects of Alternative Loan/Aid Packages
The possibility  that  harsher  enforcement  might actually  lead  to lower
rather  than  higher  marginal  taxes  on repayment  discussed  in section  3.1 raises
the interesting  question  of how new loan packages  to some developing  countries
might be structured  so as to maximize  investment  incentives. One  potential
extension  of our  model is to study  such issues  in a simple  and transparent
way.  Let us assume  that the donor  countries  aim to provide  a fixed  resource
transfer  T.  For simplicity,  we will assume  that there  is no pre-existing  debt
although  the analysis  is easily  modified  to take account  of this  possibility.
This is also a relatively  realistic  assumption  about  countries  that have not
previously  received  western financial  assistance,  e.g. former  Soviet  Bloc
countries.
In this case, if D is the quantity  of new loans  to be provided,  then the
implied  tra-nsfer  associated  with any given  aid/loan  package  is: G +  D - V(D;I)
22 Of course,  it  would  be inefficient  for a country  facing  debt overhang  to
borrow  more money.
25m'sT,  where G denotes  grants.,2  Suppose  that  the  goal  of donors  is to induce
the  most efficient  level  of investment  subject  to this  constraint. Is it
.better  to.-give  grants  or loans,  or  what mix?  Initially,  we will treat  the
'enforcement  parameter,q.as  given,  so that  the lenders'  and  donors'  only  choice
is  between  grants  and loans. Later,  we will admit  the  possibility  that  by
mixing  different  types  of loans  in the  aid  package,  the donors  can  effectively
control  q.
Taking  grants  and  new loans,  into  account,  the  c-ountry's  budget
constraint,becomes:  W0 +  D +  C c,.C  +  I.  As the  model  suggests,  higher  debt
reduces  investment;  so in  any  region  the  interior  first-order  condition  holds,
it pays to raise  grants  and  lower  debt.  However,  in any  region  where  the debt
overhang  tax  is  more,  than offset  by the  high  return  on investment,  donors  want
to raise.  debt  and lower  grants.
Why should  this  be the  case?  Because  grants  cost  more per dollar  tha-n
loans.  If all the  resources  being given  to the  country  are  being  invested
despite  debt._overhang,  the optimal  strategy  is clearly  to  maximize  total
resources  transferred- This implies  substituting  loans  for  grants. 24
Combining.this  observation  with the  fact  that  the first-order  condition  holds
for  any interior  solution,  we see that  the  optimal  policy  can  be characterized
as follows:  The donors  should  use loans  up to  the  point  where debt  overhang
begins  to divert  resources  away  from investment  (say,  into  capital  flight).
Beyond  this  point,  efficiency  is best served  by adding  grants  ard  reducing
loans. If-  the  marginal  return  to the country  from  investment  is less  than 1-
when doniors'  bud-et  constraint  is binding,  it is  best to  replace  enough  loans
with grants,  with loans  disappearing  and only  grants  being  left  when the
2e  3 We do  not  distinguish  yet  between  private  and  official  sources  and  assume
that  all  loans  are  made at  approximately  the  riskless  interest  rate  so that  the
maximum  present  value of  repayments  equals  the  amount  borrowed.
- In  this  capital  constrained  region,  any  policy  which  can  increase  current
grossT  transfers  to the  ountry,  holding  net transfers  T  constant  will raise
irnvestment.  So,  for  example,  if T and  q  are  taken  as given,  it  will  make sense
to lenad  at rates above the riskless  rate so that $D$  will exceed  the amount
borrowed.
26marginal  return  of investment  approaches  the  discount  rate.
One  extension  of the  preceding  analysis  is to allow  the donor  the
possibility  of choosing  the level  of enforcement  parameter  corresponding  to
the loan  component  of the  aid  package. This is obviously  more difficult,  as
the  resulting  marginal  rate of tax  might  depend  on the  mix of the  lending
package.  IMF credits  are  generally  thought  to be senior  loans  that  have to be
repaid, 25 for  example,  while AID  loans  are  generally  made on much less  tough
terms  and IDA  flaws  contain  a large  grant  element. Trade  credits  are
generally  thought  to be more difficult  to default  on than other  types  of
privately-held  debt (and  sell  at a higher  price). In this case,  the  donor  now
has two  policy  instruments:  the  concessionality  mix between  debt  and  grants,
and the  level  of conditionality  on the loans. Given  the  continuity  assumption
of relevant  variables  in the  model, the  choice  of  the enforcement  parameter  is
a  bang-bang  control  problem,  so creditors  will either  set  it close  to 1  or
close  to 0.
Thus the  same general  logic  applies;  it is desirable  to  use-loans  up to
the  point  where the debt  overhang  problem  begins  to  bite.  Beyond  that,  it
pays to use grants. The only  difference  is  that in this  case,  by using  highly
concessional  loans,  the  lender  can  provide  a higher  level  of total  -resources
before  needing  to resort  to grants. The  upshot  of the  analysis  is that  for a
country  that  has a large  number  of high  return  projects,  and  little  capital
flight,  large  quantities  of hard loans  maximize  investment. For countries
that  have debt overhang  problems,  however,  aid leads  to  more efficient
investment  than  would  new loans.
4  Concluding Remarks
This  paper  uses  modern  finance  technique  to evaluate  the  costs  and
25  Bulow,  Rogoff  and  Bevilaqua  (1992)  emphasize  that  IMF  seniority  can  only
properly  be.  evaluated  in a broader  bargaining  context  that takes  into account
that  the  creditor  country  governments  that  fund  the  IMF  also fund  other  aid  and
loan  agencies.
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bonefits  of debt  restructuring  packages. The  insight  that  option  pricing
techniques  are  useful  in evaluating  debt  is not  new; indeed  these  techniques
are  already  widely  employed:  recent  examples  include  Claessens  and  van
Wijnbergen  (1993a  and  1993b).
Our  contribution  here is to show  how  to extend  this  widely-used  approach
to allow  for  the  moral  hazard  problems  central  to sovereign  lending. We have
shown  that  one  can obtain  efficiency  bounds  to the  gains  on debt  restructuring
under  fairly  weak assumptions  on the  production  structure  and the  debt
enforcement  process. Our  upper  bound  estimates  are,  however,  sensitive  to
what one  assumes  about  the  seniority  of official  debt  relative  to private
debt;  they  are  generally  higher  when official  debt loans  are  perceived  as
equal  priority  than  when they  are  perceived  as  aid.  Also,  although  the  upper
bound  estimates  suggest  very  high efficiency  returns  to Brady  Plan deals,  our
point  estimates  --  which admittedly  require  much  stronger  assumptions  than  do
the  bounds  --  suggest  a  more  modest  result;  on the order  of a couple  billion
dollars  in efficiency  gains  for  the largest  deals. The  basic  reason  for  these
more  modest  numbers  is that  a large  debt  overhang  effect  requires  a  high tax
on  marginal  investment,  which  is difficult  to reconcile  with the  observed
secondary  market  discount. Our  low  point  estimates  indicate  that  the  debt
overhang  tax itself  may  not  be as important  as the  broader  problem  that
debtors  are  credit  constrained  in international  capital  markets.
The framework  here is certainly  a  very simple  one  but appears  to produce
a  number  of useful  insights  on debt  overhang  and investment. In addition,  our
analysis  potentially  can  be extended  to  analyze  issues  in structuring  aid
packages  to countries  that  have  not  previously  received  Western  financial
assistance. The  model  presented  here  confirms  the  conventional  wisdom  that
the first  tranche  of aid  should  be in the  form of hard  loans,  but if achieving
high investment  is the  objective,  later  tranches  should  involve  grants  and
some substitution  of grants  for  loans. Clearly,  our analysis  can  only  be
regarded  as a first  pass at  the important  problem  of  how  to structure  aid
packages  between  grants  and  loans. One direction  for  further  work could  be in
the  form  of extending  the  two-period  analysis  here to a  multi-period
framework.
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